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The	   Japanese	   policy	   package	   known	   as	   “Abenomics”	   began	   in	   early	   2013	   with	   three	   major	  
components	  –	  monetary,	  fiscal	  and	  structural	  reforms.	  This	  paper	  focuses	  on	  all	  three	  components,	  
showing	  the	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  different	  authorities	  and	  exploring	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  whole	  
package	   contributes	   to	   stimulating	   the	   economy;	   discussing	   existing	   current	   issues	   and	  difficulties	  
that	  may	  hinder	  the	  progress	  of	   the	  policy	  package,	  particularly,	   the	  third	  arrow	  that	  proves	  to	  be	  
very	  weak.	  The	  paper	  shows	  that	  Abenomics	  in	  its	  early	  two-­‐year-­‐period	  has	  had	  positive	  effects	  on	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1.	  Introduction	  	  The	   Japanese	   Prime	  minister,	   Shinzo	   Abe,	   reaffirmed	   his	   political	   position	   in	   the	   recent	   snap	  election	  and	  returned	  to	  power	  on	  24th	  December	  2014.	  His	  immediate	  priority	  was	  countering	  the	  2014	  downturn	  in	  the	  economy	  that	  followed	  the	  2014	  rise	  in	  the	  sales	  tax	  through	  a	  series	  of	   new	   fiscal	   measures	   partly	   financed	   by	   a	   supplementary	   budget	   of	   3.5	   trillion	   yen.	   The	  government	   expects	   this	   stimulus	   package	   to	   boost	   the	   GDP	   by	   0.7%3	  in	   2015.	   However,	   the	  new	  measures	  and	  their	  likely	  outcome	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  continuation	  of	   the	   economic	   programme	   that	   since	   early	   2013	   has	   been	   the	   hallmark	   of	   Mr	   Abe’s	  premiership.	  	  The	  programme,	  which	  has	  been	  labelled	  Abenomics,	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  monetary	  expansion,	  fiscal	  stimulus	   and	   structural	   reforms	   of	   the	   highly	   regulated	   economy.	   These	   policies,	  which	   have	  become	  known	  as	  the	  “Three	  Arrows”	  of	  Abenomics,	  are	  aimed	  at	  countering	  Japan’s	  long-­‐term	  problems	  of	  persistent	  deflation	  and	  low	  growth.	  For	  some	  Abenomics	  pushes	  at	  the	  boundaries	  of	  expansionary	  activity	  and	  even	  represents	  a	  monetary	  regime	  change	  that	  takes	  the	  BOJ	  use	  of	   unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   during	   2001-­‐06	   and	   2010,	   to	   a	   different	   level4.	   At	   base	  monetary	  policies	  under	  Abe,	   like	   the	  earlier	  programmes,	  are	  aimed	  at	   supporting	  aggregate	  economic	  activity	  through	  asset	  purchases	  when	  the	  traditional	  instrument	  of	  monetary	  policy	  was	  not	   available	  due	   to	   the	   zero	  bound	   constraint.	   Such	   asset	  purchases	  operate	  directly	   on	  different	  segments	  of	  the	  yield	  curve,	  reducing	  rates	  at	  different	  maturities	  while	  the	  short-­‐term	  rate	   is	   at	   zero.	   However,	   as	   the	   IMF’s	   economist	   David	   Lipton	   explains	   the	   quantitative	   and	  qualitative	  easing	  (QQE)	  under	  Abe	  differs	  from	  what	  had	  been	  tried	  before	  in	  that	  it	  is	  a	  bigger	  and	  bolder	  commitment,	  and	   is	  complemented	  by	   fiscal	  and	  structural	  reforms	   in	  order	   to	   lift	  growth	   and	   inflationary	   expectations	   and	   support	   price	  momentum5.	   As	   such	   Japan’s	   current	  policies	  have	  attracted	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  interest,	  not	  least	  amongst	  Western	  policy	  makers.	  	  While	   the	   interest	   grows	   around	   the	   world,	   domestic	   opposition	   may	   jeopardise	   the	  development	  of	  Abe’s	  policies,	  and	  further	  bolder	  actions	  may	  be	  urgently	  needed	  to	  guarantee	  the	   success	   of	   his	   programme.	   For	   any	   progress	   is	   conditional	   not	   only	   on	   national	   political	  willingness	   and	  policy	   shaping,	   but	   also	   on	  domestic	  market	   agents’	   responsiveness	   to	   policy	  shifts,	  external	  shocks	  and	  a	  global	  inflationary	  environment.	  With	   the	  above	   in	  mind,	   this	  paper	  explores	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  Abenomics	   is	  contributing	   to	  the	   economic	   growth	   of	   Japan,	   particularly	   through	   monetary	   and	   fiscal	   expansion,	   for	   the	  structural	  reforms	  are	  still	  at	  a	  too	  early	  stage	  for	  any	  meaningful	  evaluation	  to	  be	  made,	  though,	  as	   is	   discussed	   below	   (Section	   IV),	   there	   are	   serious	   concerns	   that	   they	   may	   prove	   a	   major	  stumbling	  block.	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2.	  The	  First	  Arrow	  –	  Monetary	  Policy	  	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  Japan’s	  monetary	  policy	  framework	  under	  the	  Abe	  administration	  was	  introduced	  in	  early	  2013,	  aiming	  to	  achieve	  price	  stability.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Bank	  replaced	  the	  long-­‐time	  used	  “price	  stability	  goal”	  with	  the	  “price	  stability	  target”.	  More	  specifically,	  in	  April	  2013	  the	  newly	  appointed	   Governor	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   Japan	   (BOJ),	   Haruhiko	   Kuroda,	   promised	   that	   the	   2%-­‐inflation	   target	  would	  be	   reached	  within	   two	  years	   via	   asset	  purchases	   and	  a	  doubling	  of	   the	  monetary	  base.	  The	  latter	  involved	  an	  annual	  increase	  of	  some	  80	  trillion	  yen	  (10-­‐20	  trillion	  yen	  more	  than	  in	  the	  past).	  For	  this	  purpose,	  the	  BOJ	  purchases	  Japanese	  Government	  Bonds	  (JGBs)	  so	  that	  their	  amount	  outstanding	  increases	  annually	  at	  80	  trillion	  yen	  (30	  trillion	  more	  than	  in	  the	  past).	  In	  addition,	  the	  average	  maturity	  of	  BOJ’s	  remaining	  earlier	  JGBs	  purchases	  would	  be	  extended	   to	   some	   7-­‐10	   years	   (an	   extension	   of	   3	   years	   compared	   with	   the	   past)6.	   These	  measures	  were	   to	  be	  accompanied	  by	   the	  BOJ	  purchase	  of	   exchange-­‐traded	   funds	   (ETFs)	   and	  Japan	   real-­‐estate	   investment	   trusts	   (J-­‐REITs)	   so	   that	   the	   amounts	   outstanding	   increase	   at	   an	  annual	   rate	   of	   some	   3	   trillion	   yen	   and	   90	   billion	   yen,	   respectively.	   Thus,	   as	   the	   Japanese	  economist	   Ito	  has	  noted	  the	  BOJ’s	  measures	  comprise	  a	  combination	  of	  pure-­‐QE	  (a	   large-­‐scale	  expansion	  of	  BOJ’s	  balance	  sheet)	  and	  credit	  easing	  (purchases	  of	  ETFs,	  J-­‐REITs	  and	  extension	  of	  the	  average	  remaining	  maturity	  of	  its	  purchases	  of	  JGBs)7.	  The	  sheer	  scale	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  monetary	  base	  alone	  (Table	  1)	  does	  suggest	  that	  the	  BOJ	  may	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  achieve	  the	  price	  stability	  target	  of	  2%,	  but	  given	  the	  likelihood	  of	   changes	   in	  market	   circumstances	  due	   to	   volatile	   oil	   and	  other	   commodity	  prices,	   the	  price	  target	  stability	  will	  take	  longer	  to	  reach	  than	  was	  originally	  expected.	  In	  addition,	  the	  monetary	  expansion	   has	   lowered	   long-­‐term	   rates	   (Table	   3)	   and	   depreciated	   the	   yen,	   which	   will	   boost	  further	   the	   growth	   of	   export	   companies	   and	   make	   their	   investment	   decisions	   easier	   taken.	  	  	  
Table	  1:	  Monetary	  Base	  (Amounts	  outstanding	  at	  end	  of	  period)	  Time	  period	   Monetary	  Base,	  100	  million	  yen	  2011/12	   1,250,788	  2012/12	   1,384,747	  2013/12	   2,018,472	  2014/12	   2,758,740	  2015/01	   2,786,054	  Source:	  Bank	  of	  Japan,	  February	  2015	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Table	  2:	  Inflation	  of	  Japan	  (CPI,	  monthly	  basis)	  
Before	  Abenomics	   Under	  Abenomics	  Policies	  
Month/2012	   Rate	   Month/2013	   Rate	   Month/2014	   Rate	  January	   0.20%	   January	   0.00%	   January	   -­‐0.20%	  February	   0.20%	   February	   -­‐0.10%	   February	   0.00%	  March	   0.50%	   March	   0.20%	   March	   0.30%	  April	   0.10%	   April	   0.30%	   April	   2.08%	  May	   -­‐0.30%	   May	   0.10%	   May	   0.39%	  June	   -­‐0.50%	   June	   0.00%	   June	   -­‐0.10%	  July	   -­‐0.30%	   July	   0.20%	   July	   0.00%	  August	   0.10%	   August	   0.30%	   August	   0.19%	  September	   0.20%	   September	   0.30%	   September	   0.29%	  October	   0.00%	   October	   0.10%	   October	   -­‐0.29%	  November	   -­‐0.40%	   November	   0.10%	   November	   -­‐0.39%	  December	   0.10%	   December	   0.10%	   December	   0.10%	  Source:	  www.inflation.eu,	  February	  2015	  	  
Table	  3:	  Japan	  10-­‐Year	  and	  30-­‐Year	  Bond	  Yields	  (monthly	  data)	  
Month/2013	   30-­Y	  Rate	   10-­Y	  Rate	   Month/2014	   30-­Y	  Rate	   10-­Y	  Rate	  January	   1.866	   0.786	   January	   1.644	   0.627	  February	   1.823	   0.665	   February	   1.650	   0.588	  March	   1.514	   0.556	   March	   1.714	   0.647	  April	   1.610	   0.611	   April	   1.714	   0.622	  May	   1.770	   0.867	   May	   1.688	   0.577	  June	   1.829	   0.844	   June	   1.688	   0.569	  July	   1.816	   0.798	   July	   1.681	   0.537	  August	   1.764	   0.720	   August	   1.627	   0.497	  September	   1.712	   0.688	   September	   1.611	   0.526	  October	   1.634	   0.594	   October	   1.580	   0.463	  November	   1.649	   0.612	   November	   1.393	   0.425	  December	   1.738	   0.737	   December	   1.267	   0.330	  Source:	  www.investing.com/rates-­‐bonds	  	  The	  most	   immediate	   and	   strongest	   impact	   of	   QQE	   has	   been	   on	   the	   financial	   markets,	   which	  responded	  well	  to	  the	  expansion	  in	  2013	  with	  the	  Nikkei	  225	  stock	  market	  index	  rising	  by	  57%,	  and	   further	   by	   10%	   in	   2014.	   More	   significantly,	   there	   are,	   as	   is	   discussed	   below,	   some	  encouraging	  signs	  that	  Abenomics	  is	  having	  positive	  impacts	  on	  inflationary	  expectations,	  actual	  inflation	  and	  GDP	  growth.	  	  	  	  	  





Table	  4:	  Nikkei	  225	  (monthly	  data)	  
Month/2013	   Adjusted	  Close	   Month/2014	   Adjusted	  Close	  January	   11,138	   January	   14,914	  February	   11,559	   February	   14,841	  March	   12,397	   March	   14,827	  April	   13,860	   April	   14,304	  May	   13,774	   May	   14,632	  June	   13,677	   June	   15,162	  July	   13,668	   July	   15,620	  August	   13,388	   August	   15,424	  September	   14,455	   September	   16,173	  October	   14,327	   October	   16,413	  November	   15,661	   November	   17,459	  December	   16,291	   December	   17.808	  Note:	  Adjusted	  Close	  	  -­‐	  close	  price	  adjusted	  for	  dividends	  and	  splits	  	  
Table	  5:	  Japan	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  (quarterly	  data)	  Quarter	   GDP	  growth	  rate	   Quarter	   GDP	  growth	  rate	  IQ/2012	   1.1%	   IIIQ/2013	   0.6%	  IIQ/2012	   -­‐0.6%	   IVQ/2013	   -­‐0.4%	  IIIQ/2012	   -­‐0.6%	   IQ/2014	   1.6%	  IVQ/2012	   -­‐0.3%	   IIQ/2014	   -­‐1.9%	  IQ/2013	   1.4%	   IIIQ/2014	   -­‐0.5%	  IIQ/2013	   0.8%	   IVQ/2014	   	  0.6%	  Source:	  www.tradingeconomics.com	  	  
2.1.	  Impact	  on	  Inflationary	  expectations	  There	   were	   during	   2014	   some	   encouraging	   signs	   of	   increases	   in	   inflationary	   expectations.	  These	   have	   been	   variously	   estimated	   at	   between	   1.0%	   and	   1.4%,	   and	   the	   actual	   inflation	  responded	   as	   expected 8 .	   While	   in	   October	   2013,	   the	   Consensus	   Economics	   survey	   of	  professional	   forecasters	   showed	   that	   the	   2-­‐year	   inflation	   expectations	   had	   risen	   to	   1.8%	   in	  Japan9.	   More	   pessimistically,	   Hausman	   and	   Wieland	   (2014)	   estimated	   that	   Abenomics	   had	  raised	   long-­‐term	   inflation	   expectation	   by	   only	   approximately	   1-­‐percentage	   point,	   a	   view	  reiterated	   by	   the	   Bank	   of	   Japan10.	   However,	   the	   BoJ	   surveys	   of	   the	   expectations	   of	   Japanese	  households	  and	  enterprises	  (which	  excluded	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  scheduled	  consumption	  tax	  hike)	  suggested	  that	  households	  expected	  inflation	  to	  reach	  its	  targeted	  2%-­‐level	  over	  the	  next	  5-­‐year	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Bank	   of	   Japan	   (The	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   actual	   inflation	   rate	   was	   negative	   0.1%	   in	   December	   2012,	   rose	   to	   1.6%	   in	  December	  2013	  and	  2.38%	  in	  December	  2014)	  	  
9	  Consensus	  Economics	  Survey	  of	  professional	  forecasters	  –	  it	  is	  a	  leading	  economic	  survey	  organization	  that	  provides	  
forecasts	  and	  views	  of	  economists.	  




period,	  while	  enterprises	  expected	  inflation	  to	  be	  around	  1.6%	  (Fig.1).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	   conclude	   that	   the	   monetary	   QQE	   has	   yet	   had	   a	   credible	   effect	   on	   long-­‐term	   inflationary	  expectations,	  and	  that	  the	  2%-­‐target	  will	  be	  reached	  during	  2015.	  	  
Figure	  1:	  Inflationary	  Expectations	  of	  Households	  and	  Enterprises	  in	  Japan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Bank	  of	  Japan,	  QUICK	  Surveys,	  April	  2014	  	  Moreover,	  both	  10-­‐year	  and	  30-­‐year	  JGBs	  yields	  have	  been	  on	  a	  downward	  trend	  for	  some	  time	  and	  the	  monetary	  QQE	  put	  additional	  pressure	  on	  their	  yields	  (Table	  3).	  It	  is	  also	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  that	  after	  two	  years	  of	  QQE,	  any	  expectations	  of	  inflation	  induced	  by	   the	   BOJ	   have	   not	   led	   yet	   to	   higher	   nominal	   interest	   rates.	   In	   contrast,	   between	   2012	   and	  2014,	  the	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  of	  the	  US	  and	  Germany	  began	  to	  raise	  slowly,	  which	  indicates	  that	   market	   participants	   expected	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   nominal	   interest	   rates	   in	   these	   two	  countries	  (Fig.2).	  Such	  expectations,	  even	  if	  they	  exist	  in	  Japan,	  have	  not	  been	  channelled	  yet	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates.	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  BOJ,	  Kuroda	  H.,	  “Welcome	  to	  the	  ‘2-­‐percent’	  Club”,	  Speech	  at	  the	  Meeting	  of	  Councillors	  of	  Japan	  Business	  Federation,	  
25th	  December	  2014,	  Tokyo	  





Figure	  2:	  Long-­‐term	  interest	  rates:	  Japan,	  US	  and	  Germany	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Bloomberg	  	  Under	   such	   conditions	   of	   long-­‐term	   nominal	   interest	   rates	   fall	   and	   increasing	   inflation	  expectations,	   real	   interest	   rates	  decline	  precipitously.	   In	   fact,	   the	  real	   interest	   rate	   is	  negative	  and	   this	   has	   an	   impact	   on	   Japan’s	   economy.	   It	   encourages	   the	  private	   sector	   to	   take	   risk	   and	  shift	   towards	   riskier	   assets	   in	   their	   portfolios.	   As	   such	   the	   asset	   prices	   have	   risen	   and	   the	  Japanese	   Index	   Nikkei	   225	   shows	   this	   clearly	   (Table	   4).	   Japanese	   households	   have	   also	  increased	   the	  purchases	  of	   stocks.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   insurance	  and	  pension	   funds	  have	   reduced	  their	  purchases	  of	  riskier	  assets	  and	  transferred	  to	  the	  low-­‐risk	  bonds11.	  Overall,	  these	  are	  early	  signs	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  investment	  behaviour	  of	  households	  and	  firms.	  Higher	  asset	  prices	  are	  a	  major	  channel	   through	  which	  Abenomics	  may	   further	  boost	   the	  real	  economy.	   Higher	   stock	   prices	   lead	   to	   more	   consumption	   and	   investment.	   And	   the	   official	  statistical	  data	  show	  that	  the	  private	  consumption	  and	  public	  demand	  have	  been	  gradually	  and	  consistently	   rising,	   while	   the	   Japanese	   business	   investment	   has	   increased	   only	   very	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  Bank	  of	  Japan,	  December	  2014	  




moderately12since	  2013.	  Thus,	  households	  appear	  to	  have	  more	  positive	  views	  about	  the	  future	  of	  Japan,	  while	  corporate	  businesses	  are	  still	  cautious	  with	  their	  investment	  decisions.	  	  
2.2.	  Impact	  on	  Inflation	  Actual	   inflation	   on	   a	   year-­‐over-­‐year	   basis	   turned	   to	   be	   positive,	   averaging	   around	   1.25%	   in	  2014	   and	   around	   0.33%	   in	   2013.	   Monthly-­‐based	   inflation	   as	   described	   in	   Table	   2	   showed	   a	  certain	  degree	  of	  volatility	  through	  2014,	  partly	  accelerated	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  first-­‐phase-­‐sales	  tax-­‐increase	  in	  April,	  which	  led	  to	  pre-­‐tax	  increased	  consumption	  demand.	  This	  volatility	  was	  certainly	  expected	  as	  the	  previous	  National	  Diet	  voted	  the	  consumption	  tax	  rise	  into	  law.	  	  However,	  to	  achieve	  a	  stable	  2-­‐percent	  increase	  on	  a	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  basis,	  prices	  will	  be	  expected	  to	   change	  moderately	   upwards,	   and	   there	   is	   still	   a	   long	  way	   to	   reach	   this	  moderation.	   Thus,	  there	   is	   a	   real	   concern	   among	   economists	   that	   the	   current	   inflation	  may	  not	   be	   stable	   as	   yet,	  with	   temporary	  effects,	   as	   the	  weaker	  yen	  and	  expensive	   import	   goods	  may	  have	  been	   solely	  driving	  it.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Japan’s	  GDP	  deflator	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source	  of	  Data:	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  	  However,	   another	   measure	   of	   inflation	   –	   the	   GDP	   deflator	   that	   excludes	   all	   imports,	   Fig.3	  demonstrates	  after	  years	  of	  steady	  decline,	   in	  2013	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  GDP	  deflator	  showed	  signs	  of	  positivity.	  In	  2009,	  the	  deflator	  was	  90.3,	  and	  in	  2015	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  87.6	  according	  to	   the	   IMF	  data.	   There	   are	   further	   grounds	   for	   assuming	   that	   in	   the	   long-­‐run	  Abenomics	  will	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  the	  price	  levels,	  also	  explained	  by	  persistent	  domestic	  factors	  such	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  spare	  capacity,	  a	  tight	  labour	  market	  (not	  only	  the	  weak	  yen)	  that	  play	  an	  important	  role.	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However,	  to	  have	  a	  consistent	  positive	  inflation	  in	  Japan,	  this	  will	  require	  increases	  in	  nominal	  wages.	  Many	  firms	  have	  agreed	  to	  small	  nominal	  wage	  increases,	  including	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  where	  the	  pay-­‐rise	  will	  be	  about	  1.3%13.	  	  While	   any	   nominal	   wage	   increases	   are	   good	   news,	   since	   as	   inflation	   rises,	   real	   wages	   will	  decline.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   firms	   will	   be	   decisive	   to	   go	   ahead	   with	   any	   wage	  increases	   depends	   very	   much	   on	   their	   inflation	   expectations.	   As	   shown	   in	   Fig.1,	   and	   noted	  above,	  enterprises	  expect	  inflation	  to	  be	  about	  1.6%	  in	  the	  next	  5-­‐year	  period.	  Both	  households	  and	  enterprises	   inflation	  expectations	  have	  risen	  since	   the	  QQE	  began	  and	  this	  change	   is	  very	  promising	  for	  achieving	  a	  stable	  2%-­‐inflation.	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  a	  potential	  constraint	  such	  as	  low	   profit	  margins	   of	   enterprises	  may	   halt	   this	   progress,	   and	   thus,	   it	   does	   not	   translate	   into	  continuous	   rising	   wages.	   Such	   a	   long-­‐term	   situation	   would	   also	   suggest,	   that	   inflationary	  expectations	  may	  be	  wavering.	  Overall,	   during	   the	   early	   period	   of	   Abenomics,	   the	   package	   has	   had	   positive	   effects	   on	   the	  inflation	  expectations,	  the	  actual	  inflation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  financial	  markets,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  on	  GDP	  growth.	  	  
2.3.	  Impact	  on	  GDP	  growth	  The	  Fig.4	  shows	  quarterly	  GDP	  growth	  at	  an	  annual	  rate	  since	  2012.	  Japanese	  performance	  was	  notably	   better	   in	   2013	   than	   in	   late	   2012,	   but	   in	   2014	   the	   economy	   went	   into	   a	   technical	  recession.	  	  
Figure	  4:	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  (Quarterly,	  2012-­‐2014)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Data	  provided	  in	  Table	  5	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  Bloomberg,	  “Wages	  rise	  in	  US,	  UK	  and	  Japan,	  to	  relief	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For	  since	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2013,	  growth	  has	  declined	  due	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  net	  export	  contribution	  to	  the	  real	  GDP	  growth	  and	  an	  introduction	  of	  the	  sale	  tax	  in	  2014.	  To	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  output	  growth	   in	   Japan	  was	   accounted	   for	   by	   consumption	   and	   government	   spending	   in	   2013-­‐2014,	  which	  explains	  the	  contraction	  after	  the	  sales	  tax	  rose	  in	  April	  2014.	  The	  Oct.	  2014	  IMF	  report,	  “Regional	  Economic	  Outlook	  Update:	  Asia	  and	  Pacific”	  estimates	  the	  real	  GDP	  at	  0.9%	  in	  2014	  and	  0.8%	  in	  201514.	   	  The	  considerable	  slow	  down,	   in	  comparison	  to	  the	  2013-­‐annual	  growth	  of	  1.5%,	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  in	  2015,	  but	  be	  offset	  by	  rising	  private	  investment.	   Nevertheless,	   Hausman	   and	   Wieland	   (2014)	   notice	   that	   under	   Abenomics	   2013	  growth	   per	  working-­‐age	   person	  was	   3.1%,	   compared	   to	   1.6%	   from	   1995	   to	   2007,	   and	   0.4%	  from	  2008	  to	  2012.	  So	   taking	   into	  consideration	  only	   the	  working-­‐age	  population,	   the	  growth	  under	  Abenomics	  looks	  impressive.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  debate	  among	  Western	  economists	  over	  whether	  Abenomics	  will	  have	  real	  effects	  on	  the	  current	  output	  gap	  –	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  actual	  output	  of	  an	  economy	  and	  its	  potential	  output/production	  capacity.	  If	  all	  problems	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  are	  a	  result	  of	  changes	   to	   the	  potential	   output,	   then	   the	  only	  way	   forward	   is	   through	   the	   structural	   reforms	  (the	   third	   arrow).	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   official	   estimates	   of	   Japan’s	   output	   gap	   are	   small.	   IMF	  estimated	   it	   to	   be	   (-­‐0.9%)	   in	   201315,	   while	   the	   OECD	   estimated	   it	   to	   be	   positive	   (1.1%)16.	   In	  2014,	   the	   IMF	   projected	   a	   real	   GDP	   growth	   of	   0.9%,	   as	   they	   believed	   actual	   output	  was	   still	  above	   potential	   output17.	   IMF	   has	   lowered	   potential	   output	   of	   Japan	   significantly	   for	   the	   last	  decade.	  If	  this	  is	  correct,	  there	  is	  little	  role	  for	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  expansion.	  However,	  there	  are	  views	  that	  these	  official	  estimates	  of	  the	  Japanese	  output	  gap	  are	  far	  too	  low	  with	   alternative	   estimates	   ranging	   from	   4.5	   to	   10%18.	   These	   mismatching	   numbers	   show	  certainly	  the	  difficulty	  with	  statistically	  measuring	  output	  gaps.	  The	  output	  gap	  measures	  also	  the	  degree	  of	  inflation	  pressure	  in	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  link	  between	  the	  real	  side	  of	  any	  economy	  and	  price	  levels.	  IMF	  and	  OECD	  use	  differing	  models	  with	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  but	  the	  underestimation	  of	   Japan’s	  gap	  perhaps	   is	  due	   to	  a	  number	  of	   factors,	  one	  of	  which	   is	   the	  lower	   investment19.	   Certainly	   a	   smaller	   capital	   stock	   at	   a	   given	   point	   diminishes	   the	   level	   of	  output	   achievable	   in	   a	   future	   day	   -­‐	  whether	   this	   can	  be	   overturn	   in	   a	   long	   run	   is	   a	  matter	   of	  future	  research.	  In	  the	  views	  of	  those	  that	  believe	  the	  output	  gap	  is	  larger	  than	  4.5%,	  the	  role	  of	  monetary	   and	   fiscal	   expansions	   is	   essential	   to	   raise	   the	   actual	   output.	   Hence,	   the	   first	   two	  arrows	  of	  Abe’s	  package	  should	  be	  implemented	  with	  credibility.	  Despite	  all	  differences	  in	  opinions	  about	  the	  Japanese	  output	  gap,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  all	  three	  measures	  (the	  three	  arrows)	  needs	  to	  be	  implemented	  to	  tackle	  a	  range	  of	  differing	  economic	  issues.	  Thus,	  the	  efforts	  of	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  government	  are	  certainly	  fruitful	  in	  terms	   of	   targeting	   the	   right	   policies	   and	   instruments.	   Of	   course,	   there	   are	   difficulties	   to	   be	  overcome	  that	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  stronger	  than	  the	  political	  will,	  but	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	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In	  October	  2013,	  IMF	  estimated	  in	  its	  “World	  Economic	  Outlook:	  Transitions	  and	  Tensions”	  that	  the	  entire	  package	  of	  Abe’s	  policies	  would	  add	  1.3	  percentage	  points	   to	  2013	  growth,	  while	  a	  study	  by	  Hausman	  and	  Wieland	  suggested	  a	  slightly	   lower	  contribution	  of	  1%20.	  However	  it	   is	  less	  clear	  whether	  the	  monetary	  expansion	  or	  the	  fiscal	  stimulus	  has	  larger	  effects	  on	  the	  output.	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Second	  Arrow	  –	  Fiscal	  Policy	  	  The	   Fiscal	   Policy	   component	   of	   Abenomics	   was	   formally	   announced	   in	   January	   2013	   with	   a	  ¥10.3	  trillion	  stimulus	  package.	  This	  was	  done	  via	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  supplementary	  budget	  and	  was	   initially	  conceived	  as	  a	  one-­‐time	  programme	  equal	   to	  2%	  of	  GDP21.	  However,	   further	  fiscal	  measures	  have	  proved	  necessary	  with	   in	  October	  2013,	   the	  Government	   formulating	  an	  “Economic	   Policy	   Package”	   with	   ¥5	   trillion	   to	   address	   any	   risks	   of	   economic	   downturn	   that	  could	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  tax	  rate	  hike	   in	  2014	  and	  to	  put	  the	  economy	  on	  a	  sustainable	  growth	  path.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  measures	  included	  in	  the	  package	  are	  as	  follows22:	  1. Tax	   reduction	   to	  promote	   investment	   –	   tax	   incentives	   for	   capital	   investment,	  R&D	   tax	  credits,	   tax	   incentives	   for	   business	   restructuring,	   and	   tax	   incentives	   to	   facilitate	  investment	  of	  venture	  capitals;	  2. Trilateral	  partnership	  among	  the	  government,	  labour	  and	  employers;	  3. Formulation	   of	   new	   economic	   measures	   to	   balance	   any	   negative	   impacts	   from	   the	  consumption	  tax	  hike.	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   tax	   hike,	   the	   government	   formulated	   a	   supplementary	   budget	   and	  implemented	  measures	  that	  included:	  1. Lump-­‐sum	  benefits	   for	   the	  affected	  –	  Provision	  of	  ¥10,000	   to	   the	  24	  million	  of	  people	  who	  are	  exempt	  from	  municipal	  inhabitant’s	  tax.	  An	  additional	  ¥5,000	  will	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  people	  who	  receive	  old-­‐age	  basic	  pension;	  2. Lump-­‐sum	  payouts	  for	  home	  buyers:	  Provision	  of	  ¥100,000	  –	  300,000	  to	  home	  buyers	  with	  salary	  income	  of	  approximately	  ¥5	  million	  or	  less;	  3. A	  review	  of	  automobile	  taxation;	  4. Acceleration	  of	  measures	  for	  reconstruction,	  disaster	  prevention	  and	  safety	  (restoration	  of	  areas	  damaged	  by	  disasters);	  	  The	   fiscal	   packages	   are	   usually	   well	   described	   and	   targeted	   with	   specific	   measures	   reaching	  different	   groups	   of	   the	   population.	   However,	   the	   Economic	   Policy	   Package	   despite	   its	   well	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intentions,	  it	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  economy	  from	  moving	  into	  recession	  in	  late	  2014,	  which	  raises	  doubts	   about	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   any	   new	   stimulus	   package.	   The	   opposite	   effects	   from	   a	  consumption	  tax	  rise	  in	  2014	  by	  3	  percentage	  points	  and	  an	  undertaken	  expenditure	  increase	  of	  about	  1%	  of	  GDP	  also	  add	  to	  these	  doubts.	  	  However,	   the	   December	   2014	   ¥3.5	   trillion	   stimulus	   package	   represents	   a	   further	   even	  more	  focused	   targeting	   of	   fiscal	   stimulus	   with	   support	   for	   the	   country’s	   lagging	   regions,	   small	  businesses,	   students23	  and	   house	   buyers,	   through	   such	   measures	   as	   housing	   loan	   subsidies,	  tuition	  support	  and	  merchandise	  vouchers.	  In	  addition,	  the	  second	  sales	  tax	  increase	  originally	  scheduled	   until	   2015	   was	   postponed	   for	   April	   201724.	   Thus,	   repeatedly,	   during	   the	   last	   two	  years	   the	   government	   has	   increased	   their	   spending	   to	   boost	   the	   real	   economy.	   This	   trend	  continues	  for	  the	  fiscal	  year	  2015-­‐16	  with	  a	  draft	  budget	  of	  ¥96.3	  trillion	  ($813	  billion),	  which	  is	  a	  slight	  real	  increase	  from	  the	  previous	  year’s	  budget25.	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   monetary	   expansion	   and	   the	   fiscal	   stimulus	   packages	   have	   been	   run	  simultaneously	   makes	   it	   more	   difficult	   to	   conclude	   which	   policy	   has	   the	   larger	   effects.	   For	  instance,	  in	  2012	  the	  IMF	  forecasted	  that	  Japan’s	  cyclically	  adjusted	  primary	  budget-­‐deficit,	  as	  a	  share	  of	  potential	  GDP,	  would	  be	  7.5%26.	   In	  2013,	   the	   IMF	  concluded	   it	  would	  be	  8.5%27.	  This	  implies	  a	   fiscal	  stimulus	  equal	   to	  1.0%	  of	  GDP	   in	  2013.	  Thus,	   it	   is	  very	   likely	   that	   through	  the	  multiplier	   effects	   this	   fiscal	   package	   added	  more	   than	  1%	   to	  2013	  GDP.	   It	   boosted	   the	  public	  demand	   growth	   that	   exceeded	   expectations	   in	   2013,	   but	   this	   trend	   did	   not	   continue	  permanently	  in	  2014.	  The	  monetary	  policy	  would	  also	  have	  effects	  on	  the	  consumption	  behaviour	  through	  the	  lower	  real	  interest	  rate	  that	  encourages	  households	  to	  spend	  today	  rather	  than	  tomorrow.	  In	  2013,	  on	  a	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   basis,	   real	   consumption	   expenditures	   rose	   0.9%	   and	   the	   value	   of	   new	   loans	  taken	   rose	   9%.	   Additionally,	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   consumptions	   spending	   shifted	   towards	  durable	  purchases	  and	  private	  residential	  investments.	  These	  both	  components	  of	  consumption	  expenditures	   are	   most	   responsive	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   real	   interest	   rate.	   The	   real	   residential	  investment	  grew	  10.4%	  in	  2013,	  while	  the	  spending	  on	  durable	  goods	  rose	  15.7%.	  This	  positive	  trend	  was	  interrupted	  in	  2014	  by	  the	  sale	  tax	  increase.	  Private	  consumption	  contracted	  in	  the	  second	  quarter	  of	  2014	  by	  19%	  on	  an	  annualised	  basis,	  but	  it	  recovered	  slowly	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  Summarising,	   there	   are	   reasons	   to	   be	   believed	   that	   the	   monetary	   expansion	   certainly	  contributed	   to	   the	   private	   consumption	   growth.	   Intertemporal	   substitution	   is	   observable.	   To	  what	  extent	  the	  monetary	  effects	  have	  been	  channelled	  through	  is	  difficult	  to	  conclude	  since	  the	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  effects	  are	  entangled.28	  And	  they	  both	  play	  their	  role	  via	  the	  multiplier	  and	  the	  interest	  rate,	  respectively,	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Arguably	  both	  arrows	  of	  Abenomics	  contributed	  to	  the	  GDP	  growth.	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  behaviour	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  net	  exports.	  





4.	  The	  Third	  Arrow	  –	  Structural	  Reforms	  	  The	  structural	  reform	  or	  the	  third	  arrow	  of	  Abenomics	  was	  officially	  announced	  with	  a	  detailed	  programme	  of	  deregulation	  in	  June	  2014.	  The	  specific	  measures	  include	  the	  following:	  1. Corporate	  tax	  reform	  –	  this	  calls	   for	  a	  general	  reform	  of	  the	  corporate	  tax	  system.	  The	  proposal	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   tax	   rate	   on	   corporate	   profits	   from	   the	   current	   35.6%	   to	  somewhere	  between	  20	  –	  29%;	  2. Boosting	  employment	  of	  young	  and	  old	  workers	  –	  the	  plan	  suggests	  more	  flexible	  work	  rules	  and	  allowing	  workers	  to	  be	  paid	  “based	  on	  outcomes	  rather	  than	  hours	  worked”;	  3. Female	   labour	   force	  –	   the	  government	  calls	   this	  measure	  “Womenomics”,	  and	  plans	   to	  encourage	  the	  share	  of	  women	  in	  managerial	  positions,	  through	  flexible	  working	  hours,	  changes	   to	   the	   tax	   law	   designed	   to	   create	   greater	   incentives	   for	  women	   to	  work,	   and	  expanded	  day	  care	  for	  small	  children;	  4. Agricultural	  reform	  –	  the	  proposal	   is	   to	  consolidate	  Japan’s	   fragmented	  system	  of	   food	  production	  and	  distribution,	  which	   leads	   to	  unusually	  high	   food	  prices	   in	   the	   country.	  Rationalisation	   of	   the	   system	   will	   require	   reducing	   the	   political	   power	   of	   farmers	   in	  Japan;	  5. Boosting	  private	  sector	  participation	  in	  public	  infrastructure	  projects;	  6. Boosting	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  through	  liberalising	  the	  rules;	  7. Creation	   of	   Special	   Economic	   Zones	   –	   in	   these	   zones	   gambling	   will	   be	   legal	   and	   the	  tourism	  in	  the	  country	  encouraged;	  8. Changing	   the	  portfolio	  allocation	  of	   the	  public	  pension	   fund	  –	   this	   implies	  a	  shift	   from	  low-­‐risk	  government	  bonds	  to	  riskier	  assets;	  9. Improving	  corporate	  governance	  –	  the	  plan	  aims	  to	  improve	  the	  management	  of	  public	  companies	   via	   induction	   of	   independent	   directors	   in	   the	   companies’	   boards.	   This	  will	  bring	  the	  Japanese	  rules	  in	  line	  with	  international	  standards	  of	  governance;	  10. 	  Energy	   –	   the	   idea	   is	   to	   end	   monopolies	   of	   public	   utility	   companies,	   introduce	   more	  competition	  and	  import	  LNG	  from	  the	  US,	  as	  well	  as	  restart	  the	  nuclear	  power	  industry;	  11. 	  The	   Trans-­‐Pacific	   Partnership	   –	   most	   obstacles	   to	   trade	   within	   the	   Pacific	   region	  involve	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers.	  In	  order	  to	  remove	  them,	  some	  Japanese	  domestic	  industries	  will	   have	   to	   be	   deregulated	   before	   an	   agreement	   for	   free	   trade	   can	   be	   reached.	   This	  agreement	  is	  important	  for	  boosting	  the	  economy	  further.	  	  The	   proposed	   reforms	   suggest	   deregulation,	   liberalisation	   of	   economic	   activities,	   increasing	  competition,	   increasing	   the	   risk	   that	   private	   sector	   take,	   and	   privatisation.	   Many	   of	   these	  measures	  had	  been	   implemented	  along	   time	  ago	   in	   the	  western	  countries,	  particularly	   the	  UK	  and	   US.	   Some	   of	   these	   reforms	   by	   their	   nature	   might	   be	   deflationary	   in	   long-­‐term,	   unless	  nominal	   wages	   are	   kept	   increasing.	   Moreover,	   today	   economists	   speak	   about	   “secular	  stagnation”	   in	   the	   advanced	   countries	   that	  may	   persist	   and	   keep	   the	   prices	   low	   for	   a	   longer	  period,	  which	  will	  require	  a	  lasting	  monetary	  expansion.	  In	   theory	   the	   long-­‐run	   structural	   reform	   will	   bring	   the	   necessary	   changes	   and	   success	   to	  Abenomics.	  Monetary	  and	  fiscal	  stimulation	  could	  have	  temporary	  effects	  if	  not	  supported	  by	  a	  more	  radical	  reform	  of	  deregulations.	  This	  arrow	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  Abenomics.	   Indeed	   in	  2014,	   the	   IMF	   concluded	   that	   any	  delay	   in	   implementing	   the	   structural	  




reforms	  could	  lead	  to	  slow	  growth	  and	  overreliance	  on	  monetary	  policy	  domestically	  that	  could	  hurt	  regional	  trade	  and	  global	  prospects.	  However,	   from	   practical	   perspective,	   some	   of	   the	   suggested	   reforms	  would	   appear	   to	   be	   too	  ambitious,	  requiring	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  debate	  and	  understanding	  from	  the	  Japanese	  society.	  In	  the	  case	   of	   creating	   incentives	   for	   women	   to	   undertake	   more	   work	   and	   managerial	   positions,	   it	  means	   the	   existing	   system	   that	   dominates	   in	   Japanese	   firms	   would	   have	   to	   be	   reformed	  fundamentally	  and	  adapted	  to	  rewarding	  employees	  based	  on	  their	  results,	  not	  process	  or	  time	  spent.	  The	  emphasis	  will	  have	  to	  be	  more	  on	  short-­‐term	  financial	  results	  –	  such	  drastic	  changes	  would	  mean	  that	  most	  of	  existing	  practices	  of	  how	  Japanese	  companies	  operate	  will	  have	  to	  be	  ceased29.	  Thus,	  observers	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  major	  obstacles	  to	  achieving	  a	  “gender	  neutral	  social	  system”	  in	  Japan,	  under	  which	  women	  are	  promoted	  by	  corporations	  and	  encouraged	  to	  take	  up	  more	  responsibilities	  and	  executive	  opportunities	  as	  has	  become	  the	  norm	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe.	  Due	   to	   the	  demographic	   structure	   of	   the	   Japanese	   society,	  more	   flexible	  work	  hours	   and	   life-­‐duration	  packages	   for	  younger	  and	  older	  people	  would	  be	  of	  great	  benefit	   to	   the	  employment	  system	   as	   well	   as	   foreigners	   contributing	   to	   the	   work	   force.	   However,	   the	   latter	   might	   be	  particularly	  challenging,	  as	  the	  anti-­‐foreign	  sentiment	  in	  Japan	  is	  stronger	  today	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	   past30.	   Thus,	   while	   the	   wage	   and	   immigration	   policy	   reforms	   in	   Japan	   are	   of	   utmost	  importance,	  they	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  type	  of	  general	  strikes,	  which	  paralysed	  the	  country	  during	  the	  1970s31.	  By	   the	  same	   token,	   since	   the	  actual	   services	  and	   labour	  market	  deregulations	  have	  not	  begun	  yet,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  evaluate	  what	  would	  be	  their	  impact	  on	  long-­‐term	  GDP-­‐growth.	  Nonetheless,	  it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   there	   has	   been	   little	   real	   progress	   in	   any	   of	   the	   planned	   domestic	  reforms	  and	  there	  are	  serious	  concerns	  that	  the	  vested	  interest	  involved	  are	  such	  that	  this	  will	  remain	  the	  case.	  
	  
	  
5.	  Conclusion	  	  	  Overall,	   Abe’s	   policy	   package	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   well-­‐thought	   out	   and	   intelligently	   structured	  programme.	   However,	   whether	   it	   will	   bring	   the	   necessary	   success	   to	   Japan’s	   economy	   still	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  There	  are	  certainly	  some	  hopeful	  signs.	  In	  particular,	  markets	  do	  appear	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  effects	  of	  Abe’s	  policies.	  Their	  response	  to	  monetary	  announcements,	  for	  instance,	  the	   asset-­‐purchasing	   programme	   in	   2013,	   has	   been	   impressive,	   as	   this	   paper’s	   analysis	   of	  Abenomics’	   impacts	   has	   showed.	   Furthermore,	   the	   technical	   estimation	   by	   Hausman	   and	  Wieland	  (2014)	   is	  highly	  positive	   that	   if	   current	   long-­‐term	   inflation	  expectations	  reached	  2%,	  the	   real	   interest	   rate	   would	   decline	   further	   and	   increase	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   monetary	  expansion	  more	  than	  50%.	  Whether	  this	  2%-­‐target	  is	  sufficient	  to	  boost	  the	  real	  economy	  to	  a	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stable	  recovery	  is	  a	  question	  for	   further	  research.	   In	  addition,	   there	  has	  been	  some	  significant	  revision	  upwards	  of	  the	  expected	  long-­‐term	  growth	  levels.	  Consensus	  Economics	  forecasted	  the	  Japanese	  output	  in	  2022	  to	  be	  3.1%	  above	  the	  pre-­‐Abenomics	  output-­‐forecast.	  They	  also	  raised	  the	  long-­‐run	  growth	  forecast	  from	  0.9%	  to	  1.1%.	  A	  combine	  effect	  of	  all	  three	  arrows	  could	  add	  more	  than	  3.1%-­‐growth	  above	  no-­‐Abenomics	  level.	  However,	  this	  all	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  2%-­‐inflation	  target	  will	  be	  reached	  eventually	  and	   it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   this	   is	   still	   uncertain.	   Notably,	   because	   Abe’s	   policies	   trying	   to	  overcome	   such	   a	   persistent	   deflation	   and	   major	   structural	   difficulties.	   For	   instance,	   Japan’s	  demography	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  pension	  system	  raise	  barriers	  to	  new	  solutions.	  Japan’s	  large	  retired	  population	  had	  benefited	   from	  deflation	  and	  Japanese	  population	  holds	  over	  half	  its	   financial	  wealth	   in	  bank	  deposits	   and	   currency.	  Thus,	   the	  presence	  of	   a	   large	   constituency	  benefiting	  from	  deflation	  makes	  any	  inflation	  target	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  A	   further	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   Japanese	   government	   heavily	   relies	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	  corporations	   will	   be	   persuaded	   to	   keep	   increasing	   wages	   every	   spring.	   To	   this	   end	   Mr	   Abe	  lobbies	   companies	   to	   raise	  wages,	   but	   there	   are	   already	  worrying	   signs	   among	   the	   squeezed	  Japanese	   working–age	   population	   that	   boosting	   salaries	   by	   asking	   firms	   will	   prove	   to	   be	   an	  unsustainable	   policy	   in	   a	   long-­‐term32.	   This	   type	   of	   scepticism	   is	   combining	   with	   popular	  disbelief,	  opposition	  and	  resistance	  to	  halt	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  reform.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  real	  concerns	  that	  Abe’s	  policy	  package	  may	  be	  seriously	  undermined	  by	  external	   and	   internal	   shocks,	   such	   as	   low	   commodity	   prices,	   particularly	   the	   oil	   prices;	   trade	  liberalisation	   policies	   that	   eliminate	   barriers	   and	   put	   downward	   pressure	   on	   prices	   of	  consumption	   goods;	   uncoordinated	   actions	   of	   other	   central	   banks	   to	   counteract	   deflationary	  fears	   in	   Europe,	   Asia	   and	   America;	   and	   not	   least,	   populations’	   unwillingness	   to	   adapt	   to	   any	  structural	  and	  behavioural	  changes	  in	  Japan.	  	  Even	   if	   long-­‐term	   inflation	   expectations	   raise	   the	   slow	   progress	   of	   structural	   reforms,	   as	  described	  above,	  will	  necessitate	  much	  longer-­‐term	  reliance	  on	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  expansion	  than	   originally	   expected.	   Thus	   the	   QQE	   as	   an	   unconventional	   policy	  might	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   an	  ongoing	   necessity.	   This	  would	   undoubtedly	   damage	   the	   credibility	   of	   BoJ	   and	   other	   Japanese	  authorities’	   policies,	   which	   inevitably	   will	   discourage	   markets	   from	   believing	   in	   Abenomics.	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  possibility	  that	  the	  structural	  reforms	  will	  not	  merely	  be	  delayed	  but	  prove	  to	  be	  totally	  unachievable,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  whole	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  would	  be	  at	  risk.	  	  Thus,	  there	  are	  still	  serious	  concerns	  that	  Abe’s	  policy	  package	  may	  disappoint	  the	  national	  and	  global	  community.	  It	  must	  be	  stressed,	  however,	  that	  the	  policies	  are	  at	  a	  very	  early	  stage	  and	  may	   well	   involve	   further	   extremely	   bold	   actions,	   as	   the	   stakes	   are	   high,	   both	   nationally	   and	  globally.	   Given	   disturbing	   signs	   of	   a	   gathering	   trend	   towards	   deflation	   in	   the	   international	  system,	   a	   revitalised	   Japan	   and	   the	   vindication	   of	   Abe’s	   strategy	   could	   be	   of	   overwhelming	  importance,	  not	  least	  to	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  West.	  In	  particular,	  would	  signal	  to	  the	  Euro-­‐zone	  countries	  what	  is	  expected	  of	  their	  governments	  and	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  avoid	  long	  periods	  of	  deflation.	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